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I. In «Aquinas on the Essential Composition of Objects» (Freiburger
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 38 (1991) 317-350; the article
is subsequently referred to by «Essential Composition») a formal lan­
guage T was used to formulate an axiomatic theory TO that more geome­
trico (that is, by the deduction of theorems from axioms and definitions,
employing the resources of modern formal logic) captures a large portion
of Thomas Aquinas' teachings on the (substantial) form, essence, being
and matter of objects (that is, existing objects, or in another word: sub­
stances), be those objects material or immaterial, created or uncreated.
The consistency of this axiomatization of Aquinas' thought was proved;
hence inconsistency is not a charge that can be raised against his central
ontological doctrines -  including the doctrine of the real distinction be­
tween the essence and the being (or esse) of created substances. In this
paper we are going to enrich T and TO, what will enable us to formalize
an even larger portion of Thomas' ontology; as in «Essential Composi­
tion» every formal development will be justified or at least made plausi­
ble by citations from Thomas' works. Among other things, I will give a
formal presentation of Thomasic individuation-principles (there are se­
veral, not only one). In the final part of the paper I analyze the concep­
tual content of Thomas' central ontological notions (those mentioned
above), their formal interrelations having been treated exhaustively. I
conclude with a synopsis of his theory of forms.
II. For the description of T and TO and their detailed exegetical justifi­
cation on the basis of Thomasic writings the reader is referred to «Es­
sential Composition». (Some of the abbreviations OV, ON, OD, PAE,
SAE, TAE, AE, ED, PSL, SL and S that were used there for describing
the syntax of T recur in this paper.) In that article 29 theorems were pro-
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ved (on the basis of two groups of axioms, A and B) and 8 definitions in­
troduced. In presenting new theorems and definitions I will continue the
numbering of the theorems and definitions in «Essential Composition»,
which are here frequently invoked. (The logical notation of that article
was different, but correspondences can easily be established by the rea­
der.)
III. T (with changed logical notation) enriched by the monadic predicates
L and H constitutes the language IT. The syntactical rules of T we as­
sume to be rewritten for IT. The rewriting consists in replacing «T» by
«1T», with one exception: the specification of PSLs is now reading:
«PSLs of IT: the expressions having the form (ß=ß') or L(0) or H(0) (ß,ß'
being EDs of IT, 0 an OD of IT)». We also assume all definitions of T to
be rewritten for IT. The intended interpretation of IT is the same as that
of T, with the addition that a sentential of IT L(0) is to be read as «0 is a
living object (substance)», and a sentential of IT H(0) as «0 is a human
object (substance)».
We continue with D9: A(0) := Vn(L(n)&M(n)&0=a(n)) (for all EDs 0
and OVs n of IT, where n does not occur in 0). According to the intended
interpretation of IT and in view of Thomasic doctrine which states that a
soul is the actuating form of a living body, A(0) as defined by D9 can be
read as «0 is a soul». If 0 refers to a living body we read «a(0)» as «the
soul of 0». Aquinas says: 1. «anima est primum quo vivimus, cum tamen
vivimus anima et corpore: ergo anima est forma corporis viventis. Et
haec est definitio superius de anima posita, quod anima est actus primus
physici corporis potentia vitam habentis» (In Aristotelis librum de anima
commentarium, 2,4,271).
It is apparent that «forma» here does not mean pure form, but actua­
ting form\ else the soul would not also be «actus primus physici corporis
potentia vitam habentis». Moreover, if «forma» here did not mean actua­
ting form, but pure form, it would be incorrect to call the composite of
body and soul «this something» («object», that is here: «material ob­
ject»): 2. «compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid» (Summa
theologiae, 1,75,2). Compare also: «3. ex anima et corpore resultat unum
esse in uno composito» (De ente et essentia, 4,29). It would only be cor­
rect to call the composite of body, soul, and being (esse) «this some­
thing».
Evidently, «corpus vivens» and «corpus potentia vitam habens» have
different meanings. A living body is an object (a plant, an animal, a hu­
man being), while a body that potentially has life is the matter of a living
body. Aquinas uses the word «corpus» (if it does not simply mean mate­
rial object) both in the sense of «corpus vivens» and in the sense of
«corpus potentia vitam habens», and it must be determined from the con­
text what exactly is meant. When he says «compositum ex anima et cor-
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pore dicitur hoc aliquid», then he means by «corpus» the same as is
meant by «corpus potentia vitam habens»; when, however, he says: 4.
«Ex praemissis igitur manifeste ostendi potest animam humanam non cor­
rumpi, corrupto corpore» (Summa contra gentiles, 2,79), he is using «cor­
pus» in the sense of «corpus vivens».
D9 is the first definition that introduces a predicate which forms
well-formed expressions not only with ODs of IT but with all EDs of IT.
Another definition that does this is DIO: Sub(O) := Vn(0=n) (for all EDs
0 and OVs n of IT, where n does not occur in 0). According to the inten­
ded interpretation we may read Sub(0) as defined by DIO as «0 is a (first)
substance» or as «0 is an object» (or as «0 subsists»). (x)Sub(x) is a tri­
vial logical truth; it means according to the intended interpretation that
every object is an object; hut from it we cannot infer «Sub(O)» for every
ED 0 of IT, which according to the intended interpretation means that all
(considered) entities (be they quantified over or merely designated) are
objects. The deductive restrictions specified for the logic of T also apply
to the logic of IT.
TO rewritten for IT and enriched by the axioms Cl: (x)(H(x)>L(x)&
M(x)), C2: (x)(H(x)>Vx'(I(x')&x'=a(x))), C3: VxH(x) constitutes part of
system ITO. Concerning Cl: According to the intended interpretation Cl
says that every human object is a living material object. But isn't Socrates
a human object that is not a living material object? Here we must remem­
ber that we are using the word «object» in the sense of «existent object».
Now, «existent» may mean the same as «now existent» or the same as «at
some time existent», and the meaning of «living» has to be distinguished
accordingly, since: 5. «vivere enim est esse viventis» (Summa contra gen­
tiles, 2,57). If «existent» means the same as «now existent» and «living»
the same as «now living», then Socrates is neither a human object (human
now existent object) nor a living (now living) material object; if
«existent» means the same as «at some time existent» and «living» the
same as «at some time living», then Socrates is both a human object (hu­
man at some time existent object) and a living (at some time living) mate­
rial object. Instead of «human object» we say more familiarly «human
being», and instead of «living material object» «living body»; but it must
be kept in mind that these predicates (and all others introduced as rea­
dings of formal predicates forming sententials with ODs of IT) have an
existential (and substantial) import according to the intended interpre­
tation. -  There is no question that Cl squares with Thomasic (but not
with Cartesian or Platonic) doctrine.
Concerning C2: C2 says that the actuating form, that is, in view of
C l, the soul of every human being is a created immaterial object (an
intelligence). This cannot be expressed in the following manner:
(x)(H(x)>I(a(x))), since this is not a well-formed expression of IT (see
«Essential Composition»). Aquinas writes: 6. «Est ergo distinctio earum
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[intelligentiarum] ad invicem, secundum gradum potentiae et actus; ita
quod intelligentia superior, quae magis propinqua est primo, habet plus
de actu et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis. Et hoc completur in anima
humana, quae tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus» (De
ente et essentia, 5,29).
Concerning C3: C3 simply states an empirical fact: there are human
beings. C3 is the first axiom stating the existence of a certain kind of
object.
In the intended interpretation, Aquinas would have agreed to
(x)(H(x)iff L(x)&M(x)&Vx'(I(x')&x'=a(x))). Not so a modern Thomist
who knows that the universe is much larger than Aquinas thought it to be.
For all he knows, it may well contain a living body whose actuating form
is an intellectual substance, but which is not a human being (for example,
because it has an amoeba-like appearance).
C2 is a problematic axiom, for by C3 we can deduce from it Vx'I(x’)
-  «There are intellectual substances». Not so problematic is C l; by C3
we can deduce from it VxM(x) -  «There are material objects».
There is evidence that Aquinas would also have agreed to (x)(H(x) iff
L(x)&M(x)&Sub(a(x))): We have Cl and 7. «Relinquitur igitur animam
humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens esse aliquid incorporeum et
subsistens» (Summa theologiae, 1,75,2), which supports (x)(H(x)>
Sub(a(x))); and Aquinas states 8. «relinquitur quod, cum animae bruto­
rum animalium per se non operentur, non sint subsistentes: similiter enim
unumquodque habet esse et operationem» (Summa theologiae, 1,75,3),
which supports (x)(non H(x)&L(x)&M(x)>nonSub(a(x))), since Aquinas
would agree to: (a) that every non-human living material object is a brute
animal or a plant; (b) that the souls of plants do not subsist (are not
substances). From Cl, (x)(H(x)>Sub(a(x))), (x)(nonH(x)&L(x)&M(x)>
nonSub(a(x))) we get (x)(H(x) iff L(x)&M(x)&Sub(a(x))).
L(x)&M(x)&Sub(a(x)) and L(x)&M(x)&Vx'(I(x')&x'=a(x)) are (initi­
ally) not provably equivalent sententials of IT; from Vx'(I(x')& x'=a(x))
we get Sub(a(x)) (by DIO), but not vice versa. The gap between L(x)&
M(x)&Sub(a(x)) and L(x)&M(x)&Vx'(I(x')& x'=a(x)) can in keeping with
Thomasic doctrine be closed by two further axioms of ITO, C4:
(x)(x )(x'=a(x)vx'=f(x)>nonM(x')) {If an object is the actuating or pure
form of an object, then it is immaterial', C4 contains B5 and T2 as special
cases), and C5: (x')(x)(M(x)&x'=a(x)>C(x')) {If an object is the actuating
form of a material object, then it is created). From C5 follows (x)(H(x)
>nonVx'(D(x')&x'=a(x))) -  «The soul of a human being is not a divine
object». Proof: assume H(x), Vx’(D(x')&x'=a(x)), hence by Cl M(x),
hence Vx'(M(x)&x'=a(x)&D(x')), hence by C5 Vx'(C(x')&D(x')), which is
a contradiction by D5.
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IV. Following the lead of D9 and DIO we can define a whole series of
entity-predicates (in contradistinction to object-predicates). D ll:  For all
EDs 0 of IT and OVs n of IT not in 0: (al) FP(0) := Vn(0=f(n)), (a2)
FA(0) := Vn(0=a(n)), (b) S(0) := Vn(0=s(n)), (c) W(0) := Vn(0=w(n)),
(d) Mat(0) := Vn(M(n)&0=m(n)), (e) N(0) := Vn(0=c(n)), (f) F(0) :=
FP(0)vFA(0). The definienda are to be read as «0 is a pure (substantial)
form», «0 is an actuating (substantial) form», «0 is an esse» (instead of «0
is a being» which is ambiguous; it could also mean the same as «0 is an
entity» or «0 is an object»), «0 is an essence», «0 is a (parcel of) matter»
(«0 is a materia determinata»), «0 is an empty aspect», «0 is a pure or
actuating form».
Since we are still concerned with what Aquinas says about the essen­
tial composition of objects, substantial forms are the only forms we are
dealing with (but compare section XIV). (This is the reason why we sim­
ply say «form» instead of «substantial form».) Of course Aquinas has
accidental forms, too.
By being a substantial form a form is not automatically a subsistent
form, a form which is a substance (an object). Without doubt, however,
some substantial forms are for Aquinas subsistent forms: T30: Vx'FA(x')
(There is an object which is an actuating form). Proof: VxH(x) by C3,
hence VxVx'(I(x')&x'=a(x)) by C2, hence Vx'Vx(x'=a(x)), hence Vx'
FA(x') by DI 1 (a2). The existence of subsistent actuating forms -  namely
of human souls -  follows in view of C2 from the existence of human
beings. We will prove later on, on the basis of one more axiom of ITO,
that there is also a subsistent pure form.
Being an immaterial object coincides with being an object which is
an actuating form: T31: (x)(nonM(x) iff FA(x)). Proof: (i) assume
nonM(x), hence by D3, T1 x=a(x), hence Vx'(x=a(x')), hence by D ll(a2)
FA(x); (ii) assume FA(x), hence by D ll Vx'(x=a(x')), hence by C4
nonM(x). Further we have T32: (x)(D(x)>FP(x)) (Every divine object is a
subsistent pure form). Proof, assume D(x), hence by T21(e) x=f(x),
hence Vx'(x=f(x')), hence FP(x). The converse of T32 is not provable.
T33: (x)(FP(x)>FA(x)) (Every subsistent pure form is a subsistent actua­
ting form). Proof: assume FP(x), hence Vx'(x=f(x')) by D ll(a l), hence
nonM(x) by C4, hence x=a(x) by T l, D3, hence Vx'(x=a(x')), hence
FA(x) by D ll(a2). From T33 we obtain easily by DI 1(f) T34: (x)(F(x)
iff FA(x)) (The subsistent pure or actuating forms are the subsistent ac­
tuating forms). And from T34 and T31 we obtain T35: (x)(M(x) iff
nonF(x)) (Every object is either a material object or a subsistent pure or
actuating form).
V. Aquinas holds that there is at most one subsistent esse (an esse which
is an object): 9. «Esse autem, in quantum est esse, non potest esse diver­
sum; potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse, sicut
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esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis. Illud igitur quod est subsistens non
potest esse nisi unum tantum» (Summa contra gentiles, 2,52). That is,
VxS(x)>Vx(S(x)&(x')(S(x')>x=x')), which is logically equivalent to a fur­
ther axiom of ITO, C6: (x)(x')(S(x)&S(x')>x=x'). Moreover Aquinas
holds that there is a divine object, C7: VxD(x).
By C6 and C7 we have the following theorems: T36: VxFP(x) {There
is a subsistent pure form). Proof: T32, C7. T37: V!xS(x) {There is ex­
actly one subsistent esse). Proof: VxD(x) by C7, hence Vx(x=s(x)) by
T21(c), hence VxVx'(x=s(x')), hence VxS(x) by DI 1(b), hence V!xS(x)
by C6. T38: (x)(D(x)>S(x)) {Every divine object is a subsistent esse).
Proof, assume D(x), hence x=s(x) by T21(c), hence Vx'(x=s(x')), hence
S(x) by DI 1(b). T39: (x)(x')(D(x)&D(x')>x=x') {There is at most one di­
vine object). Proof: T38, C6. Concerning C6, T38 (and its proof with the
help of T21(c)) and T39 (and its proof with the help of T38, C6) compare
the following quotation: 10. «Item, esse abstractum est unum tantum; ut
albedo si esset abstracta, esset una tantum. Sed Deus est ipsum esse ab­
stractum, quum sit suum esse, ut probatum est supra. Impossibile est igi­
tur esse nisi unum Deum» (Summa contra gentiles, 1,42). T40: V!xD(x)
{There is exactly one divine object). Proof: C l, T39. T41: (x)(D(x) iff
S(x)) {The divine objects are the subsistent «esses»). Proof: T38; assume
S(x); Vx'D(x') by Cl, hence by T38 Vx’(D(x’)&S(x')), hence by C6 D(x).
If we introduce into IT the operator of definite description «i» (forming
complex ONs from monadic predicates) and employ its logic, we can
prove T42: ixD(x)=ixS(x) {God is the subsistent esse). Proof: T41, T40.
Compare: 11. «Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens» (Summa theolo­
giae, 1,44,1). The reading of ixD(x) -  «the divine object» -  as «God» is
reflected in D12: d := ixD(x). T43: d=s(d)&(x)(x=s(x)>x=d) {God is the
only object that is its being). Proof: V!xD(x) by T40, hence D(ixD(x)),
hence D(d) by D12, hence d=s(d) by T21(c); assume x=s(x); hence
Vx'(x=s(x'))& Vx'(d=s(x')), hence by DI 1(b) and C6 x=d. Compare with
T43 and its proof the following quotation (the continuation of quotation
9): 12. «Illud [esse] igitur quod est subsistens non potest esse nisi unum
tantum. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil
igitur aliud praeter Ipsum potest esse suum esse: oportet igitur in omni
substantia quae est praeter Ipsum, aliud esse ipsam substantiam et aliud
eius esse» (Summa contra gentiles, 2,52). Further: T44: w(d)=s(d)&
(x)(w(x)=s(x)>x=d) {God is the only object whose essence is its being).
Proof: V!xD(x) by T40, hence D(ixD(x)), hence D(d) by D I2, hence
w(d)=s(d) by D5, D4; assume w(x)=s(x), hence D(x) by T15, D4; hence
x=d by T39 (D(d)). T45: W(d)&FA(d)&FP(d) {God is a subsistent es­
sence, a subsistent actuating form, and a subsistent pure form). Proof:
D(d) by T40, D12; hence d=w(d) by T21(b), hence Vx'(d=w(x')), hence
W(d) by DI 1(c); hence d=a(d) by T16(a), D3, T l, hence Vx’(d=a(x')),
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hence FA(d) by Dll(a2); hence d=f(d) by T21(e), hence Vx'(d=f(x')),
hence FP(d) b y D ll(a l).
While by now it is both possible to prove that God is the only object
that is its essence, and that God is the only object that is its pure form, it
is neither possible to prove that God is the only subsistent essence (the
only object that is an essence), nor that God is the only subsistent pure
form. As far as I know, Aquinas says nowhere that God is the only subsi­
stent essence, and, of course, he does not say that God is the only subsi­
stent pure form, since he does not distinguish between actuating form and
pure form (although he should; see «Essential Composition», p. 320), and
thus there are, to his mind, simply many subsistent forms. But those pro­
positions may be considered to be in the spirit of Aquinas. By adding
(x)(x')(W(x)&W(x')>x=x') and (x)(x’)(FP(x)&FP(x,)>x=x') to ITO they
become provable in ITO (relative to the intended interpretation of IT),
and hence also d=ixS(x)=ixW(x)=ixFP(x) - «God is the subsistent esse,
which is the subsistent essence, which is the subsistent pure form».
While for all objects other than God being an object (a subsistent,
and hence existent entity) means being a substance (substantia prima),
Aquinas denies that God is a substance (compare Summa Theologiae,
1,3,5); this should not keep us from calling God a substance, and from
using the terms «substance» and «object» interchangeably wherever they
occur. Aquinas' main motivation in excluding God from the genus of sub­
stance is to stress the incomparability of God.
VI. While Aquinas acknowledges subsistent actuating or pure forms, a
subsistent esse and a subsistent essence, he does not acknowledge a sub­
sistent matter (compare quotation 10 in «Essential Composition»): C8:
nonVxMat(x). And of course we can add C9: nonVxN(x) (There is no
subsistent empty aspect). On the basis of DIO and D ll C8 is equivalent
to T46: (x')(M(x')>nonSub(m(x'))), and C9 equivalent to T47: (x')non
Sub(c(x')). T47 contains B4(a) (x)non x=c(x) as a special case. From T46
and T47 we obtain T48: (x')nonSub(m(x')) (The matter o f no object is a
substance). Proof: (i) assume M(x'), hence nonSub(m(x')) by T46; (ii)
assume nonM(x’), hence by D3 m(x')=c(x’); nonSub(c(x')) by T47; hence
nonSub(m(x')). From T48 follows directly T24: (x)non x=m(x). -  As T48
is a generalization of T24, so (x')nonW(m(x')) is a generalization of T25:
(x)non w(x)=m(x). In order to obtain (x')nonW(m(x')) as a theorem -
«The matter of no object is an essence» -  we need to add further axioms:
CIO: (x')(M(x')>nonW(m(x'))), CH: (x')nonW(c(x')). From these axioms
T49: (x')nonW(m(x')) follows in the same manner as T48 follows from
T46 and T47. (The axioms C4, C9, C ll by containing as special cases
axioms of the system TO (B5, B4(a), B4(e)) can replace those axioms.)
V V ii - _ V -
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VII. We leave ITO in the state attained so far; whatever ITO will finally
amount to, let 2TO be ITO enriched by the Thomasic individuation­
axioms. Individuation-axioms have the general form (x)(x')(B[B(x)=
B(x')]>A[x,x']) or the general form (x)(x')(A[x,x']>B(x)=B(x')), where
B(x) is an AE of IT having x as its OV.
Is every S of T1 having the form (x)(x’)(B(x)=B(x')>x=x') a Thomasic
individuation-axiom? Even if it were so, we could not consistently add
«Every S of IT having the form (x)(x')(B(x)=B(x')>x=x') is an axiom of
2TO» to ITO; since we can prove in ITO T50: VxVx'(a(x)=a(x')& non
x=x’) (There are different objects whose actuating forms are identical).
Proof: VxH(x) by C3, hence by C2 Vx(H(x)&Vx'(I(x’)&x'=a(x))), hence
VxVx'(H(x)&I(x')&x'=a(x)), hence by C l, D6 VxVx'(M(x)&nonM(x')&
x’=a(x)), hence by T l, D3 VxVx,(M(x)&nonM(x,)&x'=a(x')&x’=a(x)),
hence VxVx'(a(x)=a(x')& non x=x'). The actuating form of the soul of a
human being, which is an immaterial object, is the soul itself, which is
the actuating form of the human being; hence these actuating forms are
identical; but the soul of a human being is not the human being, the one
being an immaterial object, the other material: 13. «Plato posuit quod
homo non sit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed quod ipsa
anima utens corpore sit homo; sicut Petrus non est aliquid compositum ex
homine et indumento, sed homo utens indumento. Hoc autem esse impos­
sibile ostenditur» (Summa contra gentiles, 2,57).
It is in keeping with the purely auxiliary character of empty aspects
to assume (x)(x')(x=x&x’=x'>c(x)=c(x')), which is logically equivalent to
(x)(x')(c(x)=c(x')), as a Thomasic individuation-axiom: II: (x)(x')(c(x)=
c(x')) (The empty aspects of all objects are identical). Il has to be as­
sumed, since, of course, there is no evidence in the writings of Aquinas
for it: Aquinas had no idea of empty aspects. (But Aquinas, we may plau­
sibly say, would have agreed to it if he had known the great usefulness of
empty aspects for the systematic formulation of his ontological doctrines,
in which alone the function of empty aspects consists.) Given II we can
easily prove T51: VxVx'(m(x)=m(x')&non x=x’) (There are different
objects whose matters are identical). Neither God nor the human soul
have matter, hence their «matters» are identical; but they themselves are
different, since the human soul is created, but God is not. T51 is —
besides T50 -  a counter-example to (x)(x’)(B(x)=B(x')>x=x') as a schema
of Thomasic individuation-axioms.
Aquinas does not assert (x)(x’)(m(x)=m(x')>x=x'). When he says 14.
«individuationis principium est materia» (De ente et essentia, 2,7), he is
not asserting an individuation-principle for all objects (as is clear from
the context), but only one for all material objects, 12: (x)(x')(M(x)&
M(x')&m(x)=m(x')>x=x') (Material objects that have the same matter
are identical). -  Just as (x)(x')(m(x)=m(x')>x=x') is not Thomasically
valid, but (x)(x’)(M(x)&M(x’)&m(x)=m(x’)>x=x') is, so (x)(x')(a(x)=
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a(x')>x=x') is not Thomasically valid, but T52: (x)(x)'(nonM(x)&
nonM(x')&a(x)=a(x')>x=x') (Immaterial objects that have the same
actuating form are identical) is. Proof: assume nonM(x)&nonM(x')&
a(x)=a(x’), hence by D3, T1 x=a(x)&x'=a(x’)&a(x)=a(x'), hence x=x'.
Moreover Aquinas says: 15. «Animae humanae multiplicantur secundum
multiplicationem corporum, ut supra ostensum est» (Summa contra gen­
tiles, 2,80). Hence we can add (x)(x,)(H(x)&H(x,)&a(x)=a(x,)>x=x') («If
x and x' are human beings and their souls are identical, then x and x' are
identical») to the Thomasic individuation-axioms; that is, if we take the
word «corpus» in the above quotation to mean the same as «corpus
vivens». If we take it to mean the same as «corpus potentia vitam habens»
(concerning the distinction between «corpus vivens» and «corpus potentia
vitam habens» see above, section III), we rather ought to add
(x)(x')(H(x)&H(x')&a(x)=a(x')>m(x)=m(x')). However, which of the two
sentences we choose does not matter after all, since they are equivalent in
view of Cl and 12, and so are (x)(x')(M(x)&M(x')&a(x)=a(x')>x=x') and
(x)(x')(M(x)&M(x')&a(x)=a(x')>m(x)=m(x’)).
In fact we posit as a Thomasic individuation-axiom 13: (x)(x')(M(x)&
M(x')&a(x)=a(x')>x=x') (Material objects that have the same actuating
form are identical). 13 is more general than (x)(x')(H(x)&H(x')&a(x)=
a(x')>x=x') (in view of Cl); and Aquinas says: 16. «Impossibile est enim
plurium numero diversorum esse unam formam, sicut impossibile est
quod eorum sit unum esse» (Summa theologiae, 1,76,2). This cannot be
represented by (x)(x')(a(x)=a(x')>x=x'), which is contradicted by T50;
and it cannot be represented by (x)(x')(f(x)=f(x')>x=x'), since Aquinas by
«forma» clearly means actuating form in the context from which quo­
tation 16 is taken: 17. «Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus esse unum
omnium hominum omnino est impossibile. ... Similiter etiam patet hoc
esse impossibile, si, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, intellectus ponatur
pars, seu potentia, animae quae est hominis forma, [quotation 16]: nam
forma est essendi principium» (Summa theologiae, 1,76,2). The argument
in quotation 17, of which quotation 16 is a part, is used to decide the
question «Utrum intellectivum principium multiplicetur secundum
multiplicationem corporum» in the positive. For this it is sufficient to
suppose that different material objects have different actuating forms
(13), and this is what Aquinas intends by «impossibile est enim plurium
numero diversorum esse unam formam»; then: different human beings
have different souls ((x)(x')(H(x)&H(x')&a(x)=a(x,)>x=x')), hence (?) the
intellects of different human beings are different.
Quotation 17 contains more information than is pertaining to 13
alone; namely information that is represented by the principle (x)(x‘)
(M(x)& M(x')&s(x)=s(x')>x=x'). If we say that part of quotation 17 is
represented by 13, and -  in spite of the literal content -  not by
(x)(x')(a(x)= a(x')> x=x'), it is only appropriate to say that another part of
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quotation 17(what follows after «sicut» in quotation 16) is-represented by
(x)(x*)(M(x)& M(x')&s(x)=s(x')> x=x’), and -  again in spite of the literal
content -  not by (x)(x')(s(x)=s(x')>x=x'). However, there is independent
support for this latter principle: 18. «esse diversum est in diversis» (De
ente et essentia, 5,30). Thus we accept as a fourth Thomasic indivi­
duation-axiom 14: (x)(x')(s(x)=s(x')>x=x').
VIII. 14 shows that, while not every sentence of IT having the form
(x)(x')(ß(x)=ß(x')>x=x’) is a Thomasic individuation-axiom, at least one
sentence is. Is (x)(x')(f(x)=f(x,)>x=x') another one? It seems, the question
has to be denied. There are in fact not only one but several human beings;
but they all have the same pure (substantial) form: humanity (while each
of the many human beings has a different actuating (substantial) form,
that is, a different soul); hence there are different objects that have the
same pure form.
This argument presupposes that the pure form of a human being x is
humanity. But alternatively we could say that the pure form of a human
being x is not humanity, but rather the humanity o f x, and if x and y are
different human beings, then the humanity of x -  the pure form of x -  is
different from the humanity of y -  the pure form of y; and that con­
sequently there is no counter-example to (x)(x')(f(x)=f(x')>x=x') in the
realm of human beings. Which of these two arguments is in the spirit of
Aquinas?
In Thomasic ontological doctrine there are several distinctions con­
cerning forms (the word «form» is still always to be taken to mean the
same as «substantial form»). The distinction between subsistent forms
and non-subsistent forms, the distinction (although not recognized by
Aquinas) between pure forms and actuating forms have been discussed.
Now yet another Thomasic distinction concerning forms becomes rele­
vant: the distinction between universal and individual forms. In the fol­
lowing passage Aquinas is speaking about universal forms: 19. «formae
quae sunt receptibiles in materia, individuantur per materiam, quae non
potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum substans: forma vero, quan­
tum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud impediat, recipi potest a pluribus»
(Summa theologiae, 1,3,2). Universal forms, if receivable in matter, «can
be received by many»; universal forms that are receivable in matter are
individuated by matter. Individuated universal forms are no longer uni­
versal forms, but are individual forms; for example, by being individua­
ted by the matter of the human being x, the universal form humanity be­
comes the individual form the humanity of x: 20. «Forma vero finitur per
materiam, inquantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad multa:
sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia fit forma determinate huius rei»
(Summa theologiae, 1,7,1). Every object has exactly one individual and
exactly one universal form. The universal form of an object is simply its
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(natural) kind (species), which is particularized in the object to constitute
the individual form of the object. Thus: For every human being x: the
universal (substantial) form o f x is humanity, the individual (substantial)
form o f x is the humanity o f x. We know that the actuating form of a hu­
man being x is the soul o f x. What is the pure form of x?
We proceed on the basis of the assumption that the functions as­
signing the universal form and the individual form to objects are each
identical (on the basis of Thomasic doctrine) to one of the six basic as­
pect-functions. From these we rule out the matter of, the empty aspect o f
and the being of, obviously neither the universal form o f nor the indivi­
dualform o f can be identified with one of those functions. Then we are








Possibilities (ii) and (v) are ruled out; the universal form of is not identi­
cal with the actuating form of: The universal form of human being x -
humanity -  is identical with the universal form of human being y -  hu­
manity -  , x being different from y; but the actuating form of x -  the soul
of x -  is different from the actuating form of y -  the soul of y - , as
Aquinas explicity states (vide quotation 15).
Possibilities (iv) and (vi) are ruled out; the universal form o f is not
identical with the essence of: Aquinas says: 21. «Dato enim quod esset
aliquod corpus infinitum secundum magnitudinem, utpote ignis vel aer,
non tarnen esset infinitum secundum essentiam: quia essentia sua esset
terminata ad aliquam speciem per formam, et ad aliquod individuum per
materiam» (Summa theologiae, 1,7,3). We take this quotation in its se­
cond part to make a statement not only about material objects having
infinite magnitude, but about all material objects. Consequently, the es­
sence of human being x is determined to some individual (x itself); the
universal form of x is not thus determined, since it is common to several
human beings. Thus, y being another human being, the essence of x is
different from the essence of y, but the universal form of x is identical
with the universal form of y. (From quotation 21 we may gather that
(x)(x')(M(x)&M(x')&w(x)=w(x')> x=x') -  «Material objects are identical
if their essences are identical» -  should be provable in 2TO.)
We are now left with the possibilities (i) and (iii). Whichever of the
two we choose, the universal form of is identical to the pure form of.
Hence, if the universal form o f and the individual form of are each iden-
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tical to one of the basic aspect-functions, then for every object x the pure
form of x is identical to the universal form of x.
That the universal form of and the individual form o f are each identi­
cal with one of the basic aspect-functions may appear to be not suffi­
ciently supported by Thomasic evidence. Therefore, consider a different
line of argument for the identity of the functions the pure form o f and the
universal form of. The word «forma» in its occurrence in quotation 21
means pure form, since it is used to speak about a constituent of essence;
hence quotation 21 says in its second part that the essence of a material
object is determined by the object's pure form to a certain species, that is,
to the universal form of the object; but it is not determined by the object's
pure form (alone) to a certain individual -  the object itself; this is rather
done by (with the help of) the matter of the object; hence the pure form
cannot be the individual form of the object, since the individual form of
the object (as a constituent of essence) would alone determine the es­
sence of the object to a certain individual, since the individual form can­
not be common to several individuals. Hence we may very plausibly as­
sert that according to Aquinas the pure form of a material object is its
universal form. This assertion for material objects can be generalized:
The pure form of any object is its universal form. The generalization is
not supported by any direct textual evidence (but there is also no textual
evidence against it), but rather recommends itself through its positive
effects on the systematization of other Thomasic doctrines, as we shall
see.
The pure form of an object is its universal form; hence (x)(x')(f(x)=
f(x')>x=x') is not a Thomasic individuation-axiom, since there are diffe­
rent human beings whose universal forms (species) are identical.
/X. The following consideration shows that (on the basis of Thomasic
doctrine) the actuating form of and the individual form o f are not identi­
cal: there are different objects that have the same actuating form (vide
T50); but there are no different objects that have the same individual
form: different objects have different individual forms. Hence the only
possibility left -  under the assumption that allows us to draw up the list
(i)-(vi) in the previous section -  is item (iii): the individual form o f is
identical with the essence of. There is independent evidence for this:
(a) According to quotation 19 and 20 the individual form of a mate­
rial object is determined by the universal form of the object and the mat­
ter o f the object', on the other hand the essence of a material object is
determined by the pure form of the object and the matter of the object
(quotation 1 in «Essential Composition»), that is, by the universal form o f
the object and the matter of the object. Hence it is plausible (although
not inevitable) to conclude that the individual form of a material object is
its essence.
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(b) According to quotation 21 the essence of a material object is de­
termined to a certain species and to a certain individual; but this is also
true of its individual form: it is determined to a certain individual, and
hence also to a certain species. Again it is plausible to conclude that the
individual form of a material object is its essence.
As in the case of the identity of pure form and universal form, so also
in the case of the identity of individual form and essence the generaliza­
tion from material objects to all objects is not supported by any direct
textual evidence. Unless we count the following: In Summa theologiae,
1,3,3, where Aquinas argues for the identity of God and God's essence,
he finally concludes in the responsio: 22. «Et sic, cum Deus non sit com­
positus ex materia et forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua
deitas». The reason given for the identity of God and his divinity is
insufficient; but this is not important here. What is important is that the
identity of God and his divinity, that is, the identity of God and his indi­
vidual form, is obviously meant to be the identity of God and his essence.
Hence the individual form of God is the essence of God.
In the contra of the same article it is concluded, not that God is his
divinity, but rather that God is divinity itself: 23. «Deus est ipsa deitas».
From this we can infer that the identity of God and divinity itself, that is,
the identity of God and his universal form, is also meant to be the identity
of God and his essence. Hence the universal and the individual form of
God is the essence of God. (This is not surprising, since in an immaterial
object like God essence and pure form (= universal form) are identical;
vide T3.) Consequently the individual form of God is the universal form
of God, and some individual form is a universal form, which means that
universal must not be equated with non-individual. (Not every universal
form is a non-individual form; nor is every non-individual form a univer­
sal form, as will be seen in section XIV.)
We may append one more reason for the identity of essence and in­
dividual form (according to Thomasic doctrine): In the second argument
for the contrary tenet («God is not his essence») of Summa theologiae,
1,3,3, it is argued by strength of similarity: 24. «Praeterea, effectus as-
similatur suae causae: quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Sed in rebus
creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura: non enim idem est
homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod sua deitas». In
his refutation Aquinas denies the sufficiency of the similarity for the
conclusion. What he does not deny is that a human being is not his or her
humanity, that is, his or her individual form, and the non-identity of a
human being and his or her individual form is clearly meant to be the
non-identity of the human being and his or her essence. Aquinas appa­
rently accepts this. Hence the essence of a human being is his or her in­
dividual form (sua humanitas).
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In the same article, however, Aquinas also generally identifies es­
sence and pure form (= universal form), what we have already mentioned
in section VIII of «Essential Composition»; then the essence (natura) of
a human being (quo homo est homo) is humanitas tout court, as also
comes out clearly in the text. (Compare also Summa contra gentiles,
1,21.) Now, the essence of a human being cannot both be the individual
form and the universal form, because a human being is a material object;
consider quotations 19 and 20 which clearly imply that individual and
universal form are non-identical in a material object. In order to avoid
the inconsistency we ignore Aquinas' statement to the effect of the iden­
tity of pure form and essence, which, indeed, contradicts what he says
elsewhere. (There is no real inconsistency; Thomas simply uses one word
-  «essentia», «natura» -  in two different meanings: individual essence
and universal essence.)
X. The upshot of sections VIII and IX is that we can read f(0) both as
«the pure form of 0» and as «the universal form of 0», and that we can
read w(0) both as «the essence of 0» and as «the individual form of 0».
We know then quite well what the pure form and the essence of an object
is, since the universal form of an object is its kind or species, and the
individual form the species o f the object relative to the object (as par­
ticularized in the object).
The identity of essence and individual form leads to the acceptance
of another Thomasic individuation-axiom: 15: (x)(x')(w(x)=w(x')>x=x')
(Objects having the same essence, i.e. individual form, are identical). By
15 and T3 we obtain T53: (x)(x')(nonM(x)&nonM(x')&f(x)=f(x')> x=x')
(Immaterial objects that have the same pure form are identical). Proof:
assume nonM(x) & nonM(x') & f(x)=f(x'), hence by D3 and T3 w(x)=
f(x)&w(x')=f(x'), hence w(x)=w(x'), hence by 15 x=x'. According to T53
there are no two immaterial objects of the same species; there are as
many species of immaterial objects as there are immaterial objects. This
agrees with Thomasic doctrine: 25. «Secunda differentia <inter essentiam
substantiae compositae et essentiam substantiae simplicis> est quia es­
sentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata
multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, unde contingit quod aliqua sint
idem specie et diversa numero. Sed cum essentia simplicis non sit recepta
in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non
inveniantur in illis substantiis plura individua eiusdem speciei, sed
quotquot sunt ibi individua, tot sunt species, ut Avicenna expresse dicit»
(De ente et essentia, 4,25). In the Summa theologiae, however, Aquinas
excludes human souls: there are many human souls of the same species,
albeit there are not several angels of the same species: 26. «licet anima
intellectiva non habeat materiam ex qua sit, sicut nec angelus, tamen est
forma materiae alicuius; quod angelo non convenit. Et ideo secundum
Aquinas on Forms, Individuation and Matter 59
divisionem materiae sunt multae animae unius speciei: multi autem angeli
unius speciei omnino esse non possunt» (Summa theologiae, 1,76,2).
What forces Aquinas to exclude human souls is the following opposing
argument: 27. «[1] Nulla enim substantia immaterialis multiplicatur
secundum numerum in una specie. [2] Anima autem humana est substan­
tia immaterialis ... [3] Non ergo sunt multae in una specie. [4] Sed omnes
homines sunt unius speciei. [5] Est ergo unus intellectus omnium homi­
num» (Summa theologiae, 1,76,2). Aquinas cannot accept [5]; his way
out is to deny [1] (vide quotation 26), thus contradicting what he says in
one place of De ente et essentia. (In another place of De ente et essentia
he states the same as in the Summa theologiae: «Et ideo in talibus sub­
stantiis [substantiis creatis intellectualibus] non invenitur multitudo in­
dividuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter
corpus cui unitur»; De ente et essentia, 5,31.) But to deny [1] is clearly
not the most reasonable way out for Aquinas. How does «There is one
intellect for all human beings»:[5] follow from «All human beings are of
the same species»:[4] and «Each human soul is the only one in its spe-
cies»:[3]? Only by supposing that «All human beings are of the same
species» implies «Every human soul belongs to the same species» -  an
implication that is not beyond question.
XI. Essence, pure form and actuating form of an object are formal aspects
of it. Of the essence and pure form of an object we have a fairly precise
understanding; our understanding of its actuating form depends on the
understanding of its being. What is the being (or esse) of an object?
It is another formal aspect of it. According to Aristotelian-Thomasic
doctrine every universal form F (substantial or not) that applies to an
object x is individualized in x: the F of x; existence is a universal form
that applies to every object (remember that «object» means existing ob­
ject)', hence for every object x existence is individualized in x: the exi­
stence o f x. Like the whiteness of x is that by which x, being white, is
white, so the existence of x is that by which x exists. But the being of x is
that by which x exists: 28. «Unumquodque est per suum esse» (Summa
contra gentiles, 1,22). Hence we may safely conclude that the being of x
is its existence.
Like the whiteness of x is different from the whiteness of y, if x and y
are different white objects, so the existence of x is different from the
existence of y, if x and y are different objects. Hence it is clear why 14 is
a Thomasic individuation-axiom, the esse of any object being its exi­
stence.
14 and 15 in their intended interpretation can be regarded as conse­
quences of a more general principle, which we state informally as fol­
lows: (P) If F is a universal form (substantial or not) that applies to ob­
ject x and F' a universal form that applies to object y and the F of x (F
60 Aquinas on Forms, Individuation and Matter
relative to x) is the F' o f y (F' relative to y), then x is identical to y. Then
ad 14: assume x is an object and y is an object, hence existence is a uni­
versal form that applies to both; assume the being of x is the being of y,
hence the existence of x is the existence of y; hence by (P) x is identical
to y. And ad 15: assume x is an object and y is an object; assume the es­
sence of x is the essence of y; hence the individual (substantial) form of x
is the individual (substantial) form of y; the species of x is a universal
form F that applies to x, and the species of y is a universal form F' that
applies to y; the individual form of x is the species of x relative to x; the
individual form of y is the species of y relative to y; hence the species of
y relative to y is the species of x relative to x; hence by (P) x is identical
to y.
XII. The actuating form of an object is determined by its pure form and
its being, that is, by its species and its existence. In what manner? -  We
can prove VxVx'(a(x)=a(x')& non f(x)=f(x')& non s(x)=s(x')) if we add
the following axiom: 16: (x)(x')(M(x)&nonM(x')>non f(x)=f(x'))
(Material and immaterial objects are not o f the same species). 16 can
easily be brought into the form of an individuation-axiom, and Aquinas
would have agreed to it. 16 allows «Immaterial objects are singly in their
species» («There are no immaterial objects beside immaterial object x
that are of the species of x, and there are no material objects that are of
the species of x») to be deduced from «Immaterial objects that are of the
same species are identical» (T53): T54: (x)(nonM(x) > (x')(f(x')=f(x)>
x'=x)). Proof: assume nonM(x), f(x')=f(x); hence nonM(x’) by 16, hence
by T53 x’=x. T55: VxVx'(a(x)=a(x')&non f(x)=f(x') &non s(x)=s(x')).
Proof: VxH(x) by C3, hence by C2 Vx(H(x)&Vx'(I(x')&x,=a(x))), hence
by Cl and D6 VxVx'(M(x)& nonM(x') & x —a(x)), hence by D3 and T1
VxVx'(M(x) & nonM(x') & x'=a(x') & x'=a(x)), hence by 14 and 16
VxVx'(a(x)=a(x')&non f(x)=f(x')&non s(x)=s(x')). T55 shows that the
actuating form of an object is determined in a different way by its species
and its existence than is its individual form by its species and its matter.
In contrast to T55 we have by 15 T56: (x)(x')(w(x)=w(x')>f(x)=
f(x’)&m(x)=m(x')). However, the principle for the actuating form of an
object that is analogous to T56 is approximated to, since we have T57:
(x)(x')(M(x)&M(x’)&a(x)=a(x')>f(x)=f(x')&s(x)=s(x')) by 13, and T58:
(x)(x’)(nonM(x)&nonM(x')&a(x)=a(x')>f(x)=f(x')&s(x)=s(x')) by T52.
We know a considerable amount about the behavior of the actuating
form of an object in relation to other object-aspects. But it is doubtful
whether the actuating form in itself can be satisfactorily described in
ontological terminology that is familiar and (relatively) clear to us. We
know that the actuating form of a human being is his or her soul, that the
immaterial objects are the subsistent actuating forms. But what has be­
come clearer by this? What is a human soul? What is an immaterial sub-
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stance? To the latter question Aquinas would answer «God, or an angel,
or a human soul». It seems we must rest content with this. (The non-sub-
sistent actuating forms are: the souls of animals and plants, and the actu­
ating forms of inanimate material objects.)
Vaguely, the actuating form of an object is that aspect of it that ma­
kes it exist (that is, subsist) as an object of a certain species. For ex­
ample, the actuating form of this horse is what makes it exist as a horse.
Vivere est esse viventis. Hence the actuating form of this horse is what
makes it live as a horse. But what makes the horse live as a horse is also
the horse's soul; for the soul is the principle of life: 29. «Anima dicitur
esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt; animata enim
viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita carentes» (Summa theologiae,
1,75,1). Thus, the actuating form of the horse is its soul. The line of
thinking leading to the identification of soul and actuating form in living
material objects is apparent.
XIII. The matter of an object is (leaving aside the empty aspect) the one
non-formal aspect of it. There are two difficulties concerning it: The mat­
ter of an object is what it materially consists of. When? Living material
objects do not materially consist of the same at each instant of their exi­
stence. Let x be a human being. Which instant of the existence of x shall
we select, such that what x materially consists of at that instant is the
matter of x? This is the first difficulty. The second difficulty is, what
does a material object (at a given time) materially consist of? There are
many levels of decomposition with respect to which an answer can be
given to this question. We may say that human being x materially con­
sists of this head and trunk, these arms and legs; or of this flesh and bo­
nes; or of these cells; or of these protein-molecules; etc. Which level of
decomposition shall we select such that what x materially consists of at
that level is what x materially consists of (at the given time)? If there
were a clearly defined first or ultimate level of decomposition we could
either say, what x materially consists of at the first level of decomposi­
tion is what x materially consists of, or, what x materially consists of at
the ultimate level of decomposition is what x materially consists of. But
there is no clearly defined first or ultimate level of decomposition.
The second difficulty may be resolved as follows: The matter of x (at
a given time), that what x materially consists of, is not the collection of
the material parts of x at a certain level of decomposition (is not what x
materially consists of at that level o f decomposition)', it cannot be re­
ached at any level of decomposition. There is no level of decomposition
such that the matter of x is the collection of the material parts of x at that
level of decomposition; but for every level of decomposition the matter
of x is also the matter of the collection of the material parts of x at that
level of decomposition. Thus, the matter of x is a rather abstract entity, in
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a different way no less abstract than the species of x. Nothing else should
be expected in view of axiom C8: nonVxMat(x).
Concerning the first difficulty there are relevant passages in the
Summa contra gentiles, 4,81. Aquinas is confronted with the problem
with which matter the soul is reunited at the resurrection to make up the
resurrected human being. This problem arises, because at different times
of life different matter was in the human being. He rejects the idea that
the soul is reunited with the totality of matter that was in the human being
while alive; rather the soul is reunited with a sufficient part of this tota­
lity. Which part? He suggests, that part which was existing in a perfect
manner under the species of humanity. Following Aquinas' suggestion we
select an instant in the prime of life of x and determine that the matter of
x is what x materially consists of at that instant.
XIV. A synopsis of Aquinas' theory of forms concludes this paper. The
universal forms are the entities designated by abstract nominalizations
(«beautiful» -  «beauty», «human» -  «humanity», «just» -  «justice»,
«man» -  «manhood», «exist» -  «existence»). Some universal forms are
substantial forms, but most are not; universal substantial forms are (ex­
emplified) species or kinds (humanity, divinity, caninity). [0] Every sub­
stance has (falls under) exactly one universal substantial form: its uni­
versal (substantial) form (its species, its pure (substantial) form). A spe­
cial universal form is existence. Every universal form is individuated in
the substance to which it applies. [1] There is at most one individuation
of a universal form F in a substance x. [2] I f  F applies to x, then there is
an individuation of F in x: the individuation o f F in x (F relative to x, the
F o f x). And vice versa: [3] I f  there is an individuation o f F in x, then F
applies to x. We can define: [4] f  is an individual (alternatively: indivi­
dual substantial) form iff there is a universal (alternatively: universal
substantial) form F and a substance x such that f i s  an individuation o f F
in x. Every substance has exactly one individual substantial form, its
individual substantial form or its essence (the essences are the individual
substantial forms): [5] For every substance x: there is exactly one in­
dividual substantial form f  such that there is a universal substantial form
F and f  is an individuation of F in x. Proof: Let x be a substance; the
species of x is a universal substantial form (by [0]); the species of x
applies to x (by [01); hence (by [2]) there is an individuation of the
species of x in x, hence (by [1]) the individuation of the species of x in x
is an individuation of the species of x in x; hence (by [4]) the indivi­
duation of the species of x in x is an individual substantial form, and
there is a universal substantial form F (the species of x) and the indivi­
duation of the species of x in x is an individuation of F in x; let g be an
individual substantial form such that there is a universal substantial form
F and g is an individuation of F in x; hence (by [3]) F applies to x, hence
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F=the species of x (by [0]); hence g is an individuation of the species of x
in x; the species of x is a universal form, x is a substance; hence (by [1])
g=the individuation of the species of x in x -  this completes the proof.
The proof also shows that the essence of x is the individuation of the
species of x in x. In material substances the individuation of the species
of x in x is different from the species of x. But in immaterial substances
the individuation of the species of x in x is the species of x itself. Hence,
if there is an immaterial substance, then some universal (substantial)
form, namely its species, is an individual (substantial) form; and there are
immaterial substances, says Aquinas.
Concerning individual existence the following two theorems hold: [6]
For every substance x: the existence o f x (s(x): the being of x) is an indi­
vidual form. Proof: Assume x is a substance; existence is a universal
form that applies to x; hence (by [2]) there is an individuation of exi­
stence in x; hence (by [1]) the individuation of existence in x is an indi­
viduation of existence in x; hence the individuation of existence in x, that
is, the existence of x is an individual form (by [4]). [7] The existence o f
God is an individual substantial form. Proof: The existence of God is the
divinity of God (s(g)=w(g)); the divinity of God is an individual substan­
tial form (since it is the essence of God); hence the existence of God is an
individual substantial form.
It is in the spirit of Aquinas to postulate principle (P) in section XI.
An actuating substantial form is the composite of the species of a
substance -  a universal substantial form -  and the existence of that sub­
stance -  an individual form. Every substance has exactly one actuating
substantial form, since (trivially) there is exactly one actuating substan­
tial form which is the composite of its species and its existence. -  The
subsisting actuating substantial forms are the immaterial substances; but
no individual or universal form is a substance (subsists) -  with one
exception: divinity (=the species of God=the individuation of the species
of God in God=the divinity of God[f(g)=w(g)]=the existence of
God[w(g)=s(g)]=God[s(g)=g]), which is both a subsisting universal form
and a subsisting individual form. Since no individual or universal form,
except divinity, subsists, every subsisting actuating form that is not divi­
nity (=the actuating (substantial) form of God, since f(g)=a(g)) is neither
a universal nor an individual form. (It is not an individual form in the
sense defined by [4], although, of course, it is an individual which is a
form.) Hence there are non-individual forms that are not universal forms.
Divinity, and no other entity, is at once a substance and a form that is
universal, individual, and actuating; it is, we may say, a form in the ori­
ginal Platonic sense. As far as God and Divinity is concerned, Aquinas
adheres to Platonism. (It is a distortion to see him as a pure Aristotelian.)
As the Beautiful in itself, subsistent Beauty, is the object of intense emo
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tion for Plato (what is apparent in the climax of Socrates’ report of Dio-
tima's speech in the Symposion), so subsistent Divinity -  God -  is for
Aquinas: Adoro te devote, latens veritas...
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